On the counterattack front, the Ukrainian marines use new tactics

For three days now, the Ukrainian Army and Marine Corps have been slowly advancing in southern Ukraine. And they do without Support heavy battalions in Ukraine.

The apparent absence of tank and mechanized brigades with Leopard 2 tanks strongly suggests that the attacks are reconnaissance probes. The Ukrainians appeared to be testing the Russian defenses in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts, looking for weaknesses that nearby heavy brigades could exploit.

The upside of probe attacks, for Ukrainian leaders, is that they can conserve their main force — and wait to deploy it where and when there is the greatest chance of penetrating deep into Russian-controlled southern Ukraine.

The downside to attacking battalions is their lack of heavy firepower. Fortunately for Ukraine, its army is a to learn army. In and around Novodontsk, near the borders of Zaporizhia and Donetsk, the Ukrainian Navy’s 37th Marine Brigade is changing tactics in order to compensate for the lack of tanks.

Alexander Khodakovsky, Commanding the pro-Russian Vostok Battalion, he observed the evolution of the Marine Corps’ tactics. Instead of an armored herd outnumbering the defenders of Novodonetsk, [the enemy] Light armor dashes in as close as possible to the village, and disintegrates the infantry prepared to attack and [then] The Shield returns with a new batch,” Khodakovsky wrote on Telegram.

What Khodakovsky described is classic mechanized infantry tactics, as detailed In US Army Field Manual 7-7. The field handbook advises: “If the enemy is in well-prepared defensive positions or the terrain restricts vehicular movement on the objective, the attack is called off.”

This is because light armored personnel carriers of mechanized forces are vulnerable to artillery, tank fire and anti-tank missiles. Dismounted infantry, by contrast, can spread out and link from cover to cover – making them less vulnerable to heavy enemy fire than APCs.

After disembarking the infantry, the APCs must retreat to safer positions and open fire with their machine guns, covering the infantry as the infantry rolls forward. FM 7-7 explains that any infantrymen who are scattered, injured, or discarded must rejoin the APCs and “regroup”. “A major consideration is how and where the two components will be linked.”

The 37th Marine Brigade seems to have figured it out, according to Khodakovsky. Our artillery hits the enemy’s infantry, shells [them], and the following picture is observed. Someone storms outskirts of houses. Someone is still lying in the field. And someone starts running.

It is these racers who are associated with marine vehicles. The shield immediately jumped to flee [infantry]and loaded – and [transports them] Back into battle.” Think of APCs as combat taxis, steadily ferrying infantry to the edge of the battlefield.

The relatively light structure of the 37th Marine Brigade dictated these tactics. The brigade’s 2,000 or so Marines ride in 17-ton M-ATV armored trucks from the United States and 15-ton AMX-10RC reconnaissance vehicles from France. If the brigade has tanks, they are few in number.

that the brigade apparently succeeded in causing a retreat in the Russian lines without A lot of tank support speaks of its professionalism, aggressiveness and adaptability. Once heavy reinforcements arrive, the Marines’ tactics may evolve to become more direct.

It could happen soon. Reportedly, the Ukrainian Army’s 3rd Tank Brigade is nearby, apparently waiting for the Marines and other light forces to determine the best time and place for the tank brigade to join the fight.