NASA finds quality control issues with Boeing’s SLS work

WASHINGTON – NASA’s internal watchdog has sharply criticized Boeing’s work on the next version of the Space Launch System, finding serious quality control lapses.

in a report In a report released on August 8, NASA’s Office of Inspector General said there were significant problems with Boeing’s work on the Block 1B version of the Space Launch System being built at its Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, which it attributed to the lack of an acceptable quality management system and a trained workforce.

NASA used the Defense Contract Management Agency to monitor Boeing’s work on the rocket core and upper stages at Michoud. According to Defense Contract Management Agency officials, Boeing’s process for addressing contractual noncompliance was ineffective, and the company was generally unresponsive in taking corrective action when the same quality control issues recurred, according to the OIG report.

The report found that DCMA issued 71 Corrective Action Orders, or CARs, from September 2021 to September 2023 related to Boeing’s SLS work at Michoud. CARs identify specific contractual nonconformities related to the work. Of the 71, 24 were Level 2 CARs, a more serious category used for issues that cannot be corrected immediately or involve safety-critical devices.

The DCA said the number of repair reports was unusually high for a spaceflight program at this stage of development. There were enough repair reports of one type — work inspections called “stamp warranty” — that NASA recommended DCA draft a Level 3 repair report, reserved for severe violations. That report was not issued because NASA opted to use what the report called “alternative corrective action methods” that included additional reviews.

The report linked the high number of quality problems to a shortage of trained workers. “Michoud officials said it was difficult to attract and retain a workforce of experienced aircraft manufacturing contractors, due in part to Michoud’s geographic location in New Orleans, Louisiana, and lower employee compensation compared to other aerospace competitors,” the report said.

The OIG noted in the report that it had direct evidence of problems caused by an inadequately trained workforce. During a site visit in April 2023, OIG staff saw a section of a liquid oxygen tank intended for use on the core stage of the Artemis 3 Space Launch System that was “detached and awaiting disposal” due to welds that did not meet specifications. NASA officials told OIG that “the welding problems arose due to inexperienced Boeing technicians and inadequate planning and supervision of work orders.”

The report also criticized the management of the main part of the Block 1B space launch rocket, the exploration upper stage that will replace the interim cryogenic upper stage used on the original Block 1 space launch rocket. The exploration upper stage represents more than half of the $5.7 billion Block 1B development cost, which has increased by $700 million since the agency set the baseline cost and timeline last December.

While NASA expects its spending on EUS to decline as Boeing phases out workers from the project, “we expect annual Block 1B costs to remain at 2023 levels through at least 2026 before declining in subsequent years,” the report concluded, noting that NASA’s budget projections do not include additional funding needed for EUS through 2027. That threatens to delay the launch of Artemis 4, which is scheduled for late 2028.

Meanwhile, Boeing uses a software tool called the Earned Value Management System (EVMS), which measures progress based on technical, cost and other data, that has been rejected by the Department of Defense since 2020 due to numerous deficiencies. “According to NASA contracting officials, Boeing cannot provide a realistic baseline delivery date for EUS due to ongoing deficiencies in its EVMS,” the OIG report noted.

“Given Boeing’s quality management and workforce challenges, we are concerned that these factors could impact the safety of the SLS and Orion spacecraft, including its crew and payload,” the report concluded. The report made four recommendations, including an improved quality management program, cost overrun analysis, and coordination with the Digital Contract Management Agency on making the spacecraft management system compliant, which NASA accepted in its response.

But the agency rejected a fourth recommendation, which called for financial penalties on Boeing if it failed to comply with quality controls. “NASA interprets this recommendation as a directive for NASA to impose penalties outside the scope of the contract,” Kathy Koerner, associate administrator for NASA’s Exploration Systems Development Directorate, wrote in a response to the report.

She noted that there were other mechanisms, such as award fee provisions in the contract, that could be used to address quality issues. “Imposing financial penalties outside the contract undermines contract control,” she concluded.

“Our recommendation was designed to allow the agency the freedom to use the most appropriate mechanisms to impose financial penalties on Boeing for noncompliance with required quality control standards,” the inspector general’s office said in the report, adding that the recommendation “has not been resolved pending further discussions with the agency.”

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