What fighters for Ukraine? The Rockets will decide [WYWIAD]

Jakub Palowski: Let’s start with a general question. How should the Ukrainian Air Force be supported now? What are their main missions, taking into account possible deliveries of Western-made tactical aircraft?

Prof. Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow, Airpower & Technology, RUSI: Air missions should be a key support for the Ukrainian Air Force. Basically, Ukraine, even with a small number of Western machines, cannot change the balance of power on the ground. However, if the Russian space forces are able to gain air superiority over the battlefield, it could lead to a shift in the Ukrainian military’s unfavorable balance of power. In the short to medium term, it must prevent air and space forces from gaining air superiority on the battlefield before armistice conditions are reached.

This, in turn, will significantly affect how the West can help Ukraine’s air force transition to NATO aircraft. Some have suggested they could be A-10s or adapted trainers like the Hawk. These aircraft are not suitable as they do not provide any significant air-to-air capability, although they can provide some air-to-land capability in non-competitive environments.

A separate issue is that Russian surface air defenses are highly effective and widely deployed on the battlefield. While Ukraine has had some limited success using the AGM-88 HARM in creating short-duration “access windows” for its own low-altitude operations, actual hard-kill successes for this type of weapon have been very limited, so actual capability degradation of Russian OPL systems is also limited, especially the S- For long-range systems like the 400 and S-300W, no Western aircraft will be supplied and the Russian threat is not the only one to deal with. fighter jets, but with the threat of more capable layered air defense missile systems.

And the last point – the selected fighter can conduct operations from scattered air bases, since Russia can attack any runway in Ukraine using cruise and ballistic missiles. Even where OPL systems are deployed, an advanced ballistic missile can penetrate.

What about the patriotic kits recently awarded to Ukraine?

First, the number of patriotic instruments issued to Ukraine is very small. There are also many items or parts that require protection. Second, even with Patriot missiles available, benefits such as Kh-47M2 Kindzhal air-launched ballistic missiles can penetrate air defenses.

The Ukrainian Air Force does not currently experience regular ground attacks. Russia has very important targets for its missiles. However, if Western aircraft are offered, they will undoubtedly quickly become a priority target.

In order to survive, the Ukrainian Air Force must be able to do what it has done so far – operate on highly obstructed, often relatively short stretches of runway or airport road to avoid becoming a target, and demonstrate the ability to move frequently. This, as well as support and maintenance requirements, will affect the selection of any fighter for Ukraine.

So what are our options?

The two most debated choices are the F-16 and the Gripen. The F-16 has the advantage of being available in large numbers in Europe and the US. This gives great flexibility in terms of air-to-ground weapons that can be deployed effectively. It is a competitive BVR (Beyond Visual Range – ed.) engine when using newer versions of the AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile.

On the other hand, it also has significant drawbacks. First, its effectiveness in low-visibility warfare against Russian fighters during low-altitude operations depends on the US’s willingness to field the latest versions of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile: the AIM-120C7/C8 or simply the AIM-120D. However, these are the same missiles that the United States relies on for its own ability to maintain air superiority, whether in a situation against China or any other state actor.

If used in an air-to-air environment for the Ukrainian Air Force, they would be fired against Russian aircraft flying over Russian territory. So they will soon be recovered, analyzed by Russia, and sent back to China and Iran, which would mean revealing their technology. However, these long-range variants of the AMRAAM missile are necessary due to the presence of Russian long- and medium-range air defense missile systems. The threat they pose will force any fighter near the front line to operate at very low altitude. Even Western-made machines cannot increase range at high altitudes, at high speeds – and AMRAAM missiles are meant to be deployed first.

To avoid countering the S-400 and similar systems, fire missiles at low altitudes at high speeds against medium to high altitude targets. As a result, missiles will begin to fly through denser air, create more drag, and have to fight gravity during the climb phase, which will dramatically reduce their range of effectiveness.

How appropriate is delimitation here?

We can make a comparison here. If Ukraine had the same R-77-1 missile that the Russians have that the Russian Air Force uses in medium-range warfare (NATO codename AA-12B – ed.), they would have only 1/3 of the effective range. It is available to Russians. Russian fighters can fire missiles at higher speeds and altitudes in less dense air, resulting in less aerodynamic drag. We must remember that the difference in effective range can be enormous depending on the height and velocity of the projectile and the behavior of the target in flight.

Therefore, any Western warplanes transferred to Ukraine must have very long-range missiles. This translates to later models of the AMRAAM missile (C7/C8) or, AIM-120D or Meteor. Gripen is a platform capable of deploying a meteorite missile.

The Gripen has several advantages over the F-16 when it comes to potential solutions for the Ukrainian Air Force. The F-16 comes with relatively complex support and logistics requirements. The airframe and its undercarriage are relatively light because they are not designed to operate from unpaved, uneven surfaces, while the air intake under the fuselage is more sensitive to foreign matter and mechanical damage caused by suction during intake. Therefore, it will be very difficult to continue using the F-16 in the same way that Ukraine has been operating with its MiG-29s and Su-27s for the past few months – from random, scattered bases.

On the other hand, the Gripen exhibits a significantly higher tolerance for such conditions than the F-16. It is also designed for short take-off and landing operations. It may therefore be better adapted to exploiting the dispersed Ukrainian airport infrastructure. It is also designed to minimize maintenance requirements. In Sweden, these aircraft are often serviced by conscripts after 2-3 months of training, who comprise up to 5 of the 6 ground handling crews. Finally, the Gripen can fire a European intercontinental ballistic missile, providing the necessary long-range capabilities, without requiring export approval from the United States. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK must unanimously approve the export of the missile, which may be a challenge, but for Europe, a security breach resulting from the recent guided missile launch is at risk now or later with the appearance of a Russian threat.

On the other hand, there are fewer Gripen available for such an initiative.

This is true, but we must take into account the number of fighter jets that Ukraine can effectively deploy and maintain. It’s not just a matter of money, planes, spare parts and infrastructure, but also the small number of English-speaking Ukrainian engineers who operate other Western equipment and are in service with fighter aircraft maintenance support. Currently in Ukraine, every person with high technical skills and English speaking skills bears a critical responsibility for the war waged. Each additional number of fighters provided comes at a significant cost, as other, more important military support missions will lose key personnel.

Even considering the F-16, we could talk about providing multiple squadrons, assuming approval of such an exchange. There will be no dramatic difference in the number of Gripens and F-16s, provided this year has a long enough timeframe to make the difference. Ukraine does not have countless pilots to undergo rapid training for the new type. Can Britain play a role here? I am of the opinion that Eurofighter Tranche 1 is not a desirable choice. Could Britain donate its own Eurofighters in exchange for Spanish F/A-18 Hornets?

The number of Hornets is also limited, although Spain can exchange them for a limited number of Typhoons, and Australia can supply the few examples it has. The biggest problem with the F/A-18 is that while these machines are easier to maintain than F-16s or Typhoons, and easier to operate from off-the-grid bases, they still depend on US export approval. New models of the AMRAAM missile ensure performance in critical air-to-air environments.

I also want to emphasize that the US reluctance to provide Ukraine with late models of the AMRAAM missile (newer than the NASAMS AIM-120B) is not selfish. Here lies a serious potential sacrifice to the effectiveness of a vital element of US air power against China and other nations. As I mentioned earlier, after firing an AMRAAM against front-line Russian machines, the missile will immediately be recovered, tested and sent to China, which will demonstrate the relevant technologies.

Thanks for the conversation.